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Abstract
56K modems were introduced under two competing incompatible stan-
dards. We show the importance of competition between Internet Service
Providers in the adoption process. We show that ISP’s were less likely
to adopt the technology that more competitors adopted. This result is
particularly striking given that industry participants expected coordina-
tion on one standard or the other. We speculate about the role of ISP
diﬀerentiation in preventing the market from achieving standardization
until a government organization intervened. JEL: L15, L63, L86
1 Introduction
This paper studies the role of Internet Service Providers in the 56K standards
war. Introduced in 1997, 56K modems allowed for data transfer at up to twice
the speed of the previous technology at a time when the demand for large files
(such as graphics) over the Internet became increasingly important. Originally,
there were two competing standards. The standards were functionally identical
in the sense that they had the same performance characteristics. However,
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these standards were incompatible. If a consumer used one standard and the
consumer’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) used the other standard, then data
transfer speed diminished to that of the previous technology, only 33K or 28K.
In this setting we study the role of competition in technology adoption by
ISPs. Despite much theoretical interest in adoption of new technologies and
the competition between alternatives standards, very little empirical research
examines demand for technology and how demand shapes competitive behavior.
Data needs are the primary impediment. We rarely observe competition between
two comparable technologies played out in more than one market. Even when
that occurs, it is often diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of competition from
other important eﬀects.
This study’s setting is uniquely well suited to meet these requirements. An
important feature of the ISP market is that consumers almost always connect to
ISPs within their local telephone calling plan. This creates numerous geograph-
ically distinct or partially overlapping markets, which leads to geographically
dispersed decision making and a variety of competitive interactions. We will
study over 2200 ISPs in 2300 calling areas. Thus, we are able to compare de-
cisions across markets, where a variety of factors shape decision making, such
as the competitive and demographic environment and ISP size and previous
technology.
We focus on understanding the role of competition in adoption by an ISP.
We highlight findings about our central hypothesis, that competition between
ISPs shaped decision making over modem choice. We show that competition
consistently pushed behavior in a specific direction. ISP’s were less likely to
adopt a standard as more of their competitors adopted that standard. We also
show that the magnitude of change could be the most important to outcomes,
though we caution that this latter finding does not hold for every model.
We employ three modeling approaches: simple statistics about agglomera-
tion, a bivariate probit model of technology adoption, and a bivariate probit
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model with controls for endogeneity. Specifically, simple statistics illustrate a
prevalence towards “even splits” in local markets. That is, adopting ISP’s were
more likely to be evenly split between the two standards than would be predicted
by independent random choice. Estimates from bivariate probit models show
the same prevalence. We estimate each ISP’s choice over adoption of the two
technologies as a function of the competitive environment, local demographics,
ISP characteristics and ISP decision-making across multiple markets. The same
prevalence also arises, though more weakly, when the model accounts for pos-
sible endogeneity between the choices of competing ISP’s. The estimates that
control for endogeneity push our data as far as they will go. It contains novel
features which we describe in detail in the text.
Theories about standardization discuss the role of competitive choice be-
tween standards, but few prominent cases ever permit researchers to garner
a close look at behavior during deployment, as we get here. The 56K mo-
dem fight had a well-publicized “standards war’ for early adopters in Internet
markets. Many contemporary press reports discuss how modem makers com-
peted fiercely for adoption by the earliest choosers. Related, Shapiro and Varian
(1999), pp 267-270, feature it prominently in their discussion of strategic behav-
ior during standardization fights. Contemporary press accounts tend to cover
announcements from firms, not the deployment in each local areas. No research
has closely examined the deployment decision of service providers, as we do.
The competitive experience is also interesting because it motivated interven-
tion from a government agency. At the time this experience appeared to be an
example of “coordination failure.” That is, there was a benefit to coordinating
ISP’s and consumers on a single standard as quickly as possible, but market
actors failed to quickly standardize. Market participants expected that stan-
dardization would arise because it was in user interest. The popular standard
would have more ISP’s servicing it, which ensured consumers of high-quality,
low hassle, low price service into the future. However, coordination did not arise
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in the first year of competition. Not only did the two technologies maintain rel-
atively similar market shares, but overall sales to consumers and ISP’s were well
below what the two sides had hoped. Sales increased only after a government
standard setting organization introduced a third incompatible standard as a new
focal point for designs. The new standard quickly gained market acceptance and
unified all designs. High industry sales followed.
Did competitive rivalry among ISPs contribute to the market’s inability to
coordinate on a standard unaided? In a final more speculative section of the
paper, we argue that the standards war was prolonged by the market’s struc-
ture, i.e., geographically dispersed decision making combined with the incentive
to diﬀerentiate locally. This discussion directs further attention at issues not
highlighted in the applied literature on standardization.
2 Related Literature
Our research goals are empirical. Yet, we lack prototypes for how to measure
buyer and supplier behavior during a standards war. While user choice between
alternatives plays a prominent role in many models of standardization, there are
few empirical studies for characterizing its eﬀect. Related, previous empirical
work has focused on either the decision of whether to adopt a standard or not,
or the decision of which standard to adopt, but has not dealt with decisions
linking choice between two standards and non-adoption.
A few prior studies of competition in technology adoption provide us with
general approaches for measuring competitive incentives. For instance, Klepper
(2002) uses firm exit patterns, comparing very competitive and oligopolistic
markets, to suggest a strong role for competition in cost-reducing technology
adoption in a number of manufacturing industries. Genesove (1999) provides a
study of the adoption of oﬀset printing by newspapers and argues that firms in
more competitive markets adopted earlier. Mulligan and Llinares (2003) show
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that ski-lifts were less likely to adopt quality-enhancing technology when local
competitors had done so.
Though standards wars and the adoption of standards have received con-
siderable attention in theoretical discussion, little empirical research examines
decision making for standards. We borrow broadly from the general approach
of empirical studies of technology adoption in network industries, though none
explicitly provides us with a model for how to measure competitive behavior in
a standards war.1 For example, Saloner and Shepard (1995) show the existence
of network eﬀects in bank service by showing that banks with more consumers
adopt ATM networks earlier. Like our paper, they infer consumer behavior from
observing decisions by firms in diﬀerent locations. Gowrisankaran and Stavins
(2002) and Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2003) look at the adoption of au-
tomated clearinghouse technology by banks. As with our paper, they exploit
overlapping local geographic markets for important variation. However, they
use a very diﬀerent structural model of adoption incentives.
There are a few papers that consider the decision between two standards
in horizontal competition. The approaches are quite diﬀerent from ours, so we
borrow broad motivation, but not a specific model. For example, Dranove and
Gandal (2003) argue that the introduction of the DIVX standard slowed down
the acceptance of DVD technology. Park (2000) and Ohashi (2000) study the
standards war between VHS and Beta in the VCR market. Using market level
data on quantities and prices, they focus on the role of installed base. Gandal,
Kende and Rob (2000) study network eﬀects between producers of compact
disks and producers of CD players. They too find evidence of the interaction
between software and hardware.
There also is a small literature on the behavior of ISPs. Closest to the present
study is Augereau and Greenstein (2001), who examine the upgrade behavior by
1Shy (2001) provides an introduction and overview of both theoretical and empirical work
on network eﬀects.
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ISPs into higher speed technologies. The statistical model does not focus directly
on the role of competitive incentives because the data are too coarse, allowing
only for a comparison of ISPs located in “urban’ and “rural’ locations. They find
faster upgrade behavior by ISPs in urban settings. Greenstein (2000) looks at
whether ISPs diﬀerentiate from each other by oﬀering services other than dial-up
basic access, such as web design, network maintenance, hosting, or broadband
to business. There is more diﬀerentiation among firms in urban settings, but,
again, because the data are coarse so too is the inference. These papers can
only speculate about why firms in diﬀerent settings behave diﬀerently. The
competitive setting might cause such diﬀerences across locations, but so could
other factors.
In comparison to the previous literature this paper oﬀers advances in several
respects. First, we have access to very granular data about who competes with
whom in ISP markets. This permits a direct measurement between the adoption
decision of one competitor and all rivals. Second, we provide an empirical model
of technology adoption in a standards war. We develop a non-cumbersome
model that links decisions about whether to adopt with decisions about what to
adopt. This provides insight about factors that shape decision making, such as
competition and other local factors. Third, we provide an empirical method of
a discrete decision while controlling for econometric issues of endogeneity, using
the insights from the model of Seim (2002) to aggregate over the decisions of
many other rivals. As such, the method generalizes to other types of decisions
over discrete choices in rivalrous settings.
Finally, on a broad level we also build on a literature of cases studies of other
industries that experienced events that looked like coordination failure to con-
temporaries. For example, Postrel (1990) associates the failure to adopt quadra-
phonic stereo with the presence of multiple, competing standards, which created
confusion and delay downstream in distribution. Saloner (1989) attributes the
failure to unify on a single standard of UNIX in the 1980s to proprietary in-
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terests in pursuing strategies that raise switching costs to work station users.
Besen and Johnson (1986) and Rohlfs (2001) also relate a number of stories of
delayed or failed adoption. For example, Besen and Johnson report that AM
stereo required broadcasters and radio owners to be on the same standard, and
broadcasts were delayed by the presence of multiple standards. As in our case,
these are examples in which increasing the number of new choices plays a role.
We diﬀer in that we highlight the role of diﬀerentiation in prolonging a
standards war and leading to coordination failure. Existing theory would lead
one to expect local “tipping” in a market with network eﬀects. That, in turn,
might give rise to either quick national unification or geographic balkanization,
each market tipping in its own direction. Instead, neither of those theoretical
possibilities occurred. There was no coordination between markets or within
markets. Local competitive rivalry pushed in the opposite direction, towards
local “splitting”, when adoption occurred at all. We argue that this splitting
fostered confusion about which technology would emerge as a standard — i.e.,
widespread splitting interfered with emergence of a technical focal point for mar-
ket participants — which further deterred adoption decisions. In this sense our
discussion, based on the theory in Rysman (2003a), is also a contribution be-
cause it diﬀers from the common explanation. Rather, we observe behavior that
appears consistent with ineﬃcient incentives to diﬀerentiate across standards.
3 Industry2
A modem allows a computer to send and receive data over a telephone line.
Up until early 1997, 33.6K was the fastest modem available for use with analog
telephone lines. A 33.6K modem can send and receive 33.6 kilobits of data
every second. Most modems connect to the Internet through a local telephone
call to an Internet Service Provider. In 1997, about 93% of the U.S. population
2A more in-depth discussion of these issues can be found in Rickard (1997a, 1997b, 1998).
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had access to a commercial ISP (Downes and Greenstein, 2002). As ISP’s
and telephone companies upgraded their connections to each other, it became
technologically possible to raise modem speeds to 56K. ˙With the concurrent
development of the World Wide Web and the use of more graphics, demand for
the Internet access and the importance of speed increased, providing demand
for 56K technology.
Players in the modem industry fell into two camps, either with US Robot-
ics which developed the “X2” modem3 or with Rockwell Semiconductor which
called their product “K56Flex.” Both brought their product to market at es-
sentially the same time, February 1997. Independent comparisons showed that
the two standards worked equally well, although there was significant variabil-
ity across and between standards depending on local connection characteristics.
The two standards were incompatible in the sense that a consumer with one
standard that connected to an ISP with the other standard would receive data
at only 28 or 33K (at most).
The ISP market was young in 1997, undergoing growth in new users and
new entry in service providers. There were thousands of small firms with very
small geographic focus, a few hundred firms with service beyond one city, and
a few dozen with national or near-national footprints (Downes and Greenstein,
2002). Only the large firms had recognizable brands, such as AT&TWorldnet or
America On Line. Small and medium ISPs often oﬀered other Internet services
in addition to their dial-up service. Many took strategic positions as early
movers into new technology and new services as a way to develop local customers
bases and diﬀerentiate from their branded national ISP rivals (Greenstein, 2002).
The cost of the new modems depended on the purchaser. Modems for con-
sumers were initially priced at around $200, as compared to 33K modems around
3“X2” referred to the fact that 56=28X2. Although modems were up to 33K, much of the
market was at 28K, and 33K used the same basic technology at 28K.
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$100.4 For ISP’s, the conversion depended on their technology. The typical in-
stallation required a Remote Access Server, a large server that came equipped
with high quality modems and required T1 lines or ISDN lines.5 Such systems
cost more than $50,000 to install 50 ports.6 Many ISP’s had already invested
in Remote Access Servers and T1 or ISDN lines for some ports as they were
also an eﬃcient way to handle 33K modems. For those ISP’s, they could simply
upgrade their server. Doing so cost $50 to $100 per port and was sometimes
oﬀered for free as the standards battle intensified. The ability to upgrade de-
pended on the server — USR servers could be upgraded only to X2, most other
servers could be upgraded only to Flex. The result is that upgrade costs were
much higher for some ISP’s than others, and varied across standards. ISP’s
often used complicated combinations of servers and consumer-grade modems,
so it is unlikely that rivals knew each other’s technology exactly. We use these
features to motivate our assumptions about unobserved terms in the structural
model.
In what follows, we interpret observing ISP’s evenly split across technologies
as evidence of competition between ISP’s. An alternative explanation may be
endogenous responses by technology sponsors. That is, we may observe ISP’s
split across standards because a sponsor of a standard may lower prices in a
location where it is failing. However we see no evidence that this occurred in
the contemporary press and, as resale of equipment does not seem diﬃcult, it
may be hard to implement a strategy of geographic price discrimination.
4New PCs accounted for only a fraction of demand for faster modems in one year. Sales
to the installed base of existing PC users through retail outlets was potentially much bigger.
5T1 and ISDN lines are fast, digital connections to the telephone network.
6Each connecting consumer requires 1 port. Allowing for the fact that consumers do not
all connect at once meant that ISP’s typically required 1 port for every 3 or 4 consumers. The
number of ports that a typical ISP maintained at a given point-of-presence ranged from 50 to
many thousands.
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4 Data
The data set used in this paper draws on a number of sources. The unit of
analysis is the ISP and we use two directories of ISP’s to create our data set.
The first is from theDirectory. The list from theDirectory is meant to be compre-
hensive, including even the smallest ISP’s. Importantly, theDirectory provides
each phone number that each ISP can be contacted through, so we are able to
determine each ISP’s points of presence (POPs). However, theDirectory does
not provide any other data on ISP’s. In contrast, the Boardwatch directory gives
information about the technologies that ISP’s were using — in particular, which
type of 56k an ISP adopted in October 1997 and July 1997 (before many large
ISP’s adopted and before the ITU was turned to in earnest). Also, Boardwatch
lists whether an ISP had a T1 line and whether an ISP oﬀered ISDN service to
consumers. However, Boardwatch does not provide information on individual
POPs. We merge the two data sets so we have both ISP technologies and their
geographic locations.
This merge has a number of implications. First, we lose many observations
from theDirectory because Boardwatch is less comprehensive. However, we be-
lieve that this loss is not a serious problem as Boardwatch contains data on the
“most important” ISP’s, and ISP’s that are not in Boardwatch were unlikely to
adopt 56k. We assume the 56k adopters face a “competitive fringe” of 28/33K
firms to which these “lost firms” belong.
A second implication of the construction of our data set is that we observe
only one adoption decision for each firm. We do not see if an ISP adopted
one type of 56k in one market, the other in a second market, and chose not
to adopt in a third market. Again, we believe this issue is not problematic
as it appears that ISP’s themselves treated the adoption decision as a single
firm-wide decision. There are a few reasons for this to be the case. ISP’s had
an incentive to deliver uniform service throughout their market area, especially
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for clients who traveled. The choice of standard even seemed to become part
of the image of the ISP. Also, competition among Rockwell and US Robotics
led to the oﬀering of exclusive contracts to ISP’s. For instance, it is clear from
press releases that national ISP’s such as AT&T and AOL, when they finally did
adopt in November 1997, adopted only a signal standard and did so throughout
their service areas.
Matching the October releases for each data set gives us 2233 ISP’s.7 Next
we determine markets for ISP’s. Consumers almost always work with an ISP
that is within the consumer’s local telephone calling range. From CCMI, we
obtain the Qtel data base which allows us to link telephone numbers to tele-
phone switches, and switches to local calling plans. We assign each switch to
the primary consumer local calling plan available from the incumbent telephone
company. From this information, we can determine the switches that are served
by each ISP, and the competitors that a consumer at each switch could poten-
tially call. Also, we observe the zip code associated with each switch, which we
use to add demographic data. We match switches to zip codes and counties and
use zip code level demographics from the 2000 Decennial Census or (when zip
code level data was unavailable) county level demographic data from the 1995
USA Counties CD-ROM. ISP’s are spread over 9,076 switches, which creates
216,583 separate ISP-switch combinations.8
Using switches as a measure of size shows that the market is served by many
small ISP’s and a few very large ones. The mean number of switches served by
an ISP is 96.8 but the distribution around the mean is very skewed. The median
7The original Boardwatch data set had 2653 observations, whereas theoriginal list from
theDirectory contained 5363 ISPs.
8Note the diﬀerence with Augereau and Greenstein (2001), who also examines ISDN and
56k modem adoption. That paper uses county boundaries as the definition for a geographic
market, which identifies urban and rural locations, but not direct competitiors. In contrast
here, the emphasis on the rivalrous behavior between potential adopters requires a definition
of markets with greater granularity.
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ISP serves 16 switches, the 75th percentile is 32, and the largest 5 firms serve
more than 4000 switches each.9 Note that there are more than 9,000 switches
in the data set so no ISP covers the entire market.10
Table 1 shows adoption rates in July and October. Note that we construct
the data using the October samples and simply append the October ISP’s choices
from July. That is, we ignore entry and exit over this 3 month period. Adoption
by July was very low. While there was significant adoption by October, still only
about half of ISP’s had adopted. Moreover, the vast majority of non-adopting
ISPs were large, so the percentage of customers served by 56k was much lower
than a half. The slight lead enjoyed by X2 in July had turned into a slight
lag by October. While very few firms adopt both technologies in July, they
represent more than 15% of adopters in October. Note that having a T1 line
is highly correlated with adoption. Among ISP’s with T1 lines, 56% adopted
X2 or Flex, whereas the adoption rate is 38% for those without a T1 line. We
also observe whether firms oﬀer ISDN lines to their consumers.11 Firms oﬀering
ISDN service adopted 56K 66% of the time, whereas the adoption rate was only
29% among firms that did not oﬀer ISDN service.
A simple way to look at the data is to take local calling areas as distinct
markets. In fact, local calling areas do not create a partition of the United
States — there are areas where switch A can make a local call to switch B and
switch B can make a local call to C but A and C are not in the same local
calling area. Hence, we create local calling areas by making some arbitrary
9Sixteen switches would be one or two local calling areas.
10There is no such thing as a truly national ISP as there are more then 19,000 switches in
the United States. Most of these switches are served by ISP’s, but by ISP’s that we classify
as being unlikely to adopt 56k.˙ Downes and Greenstein (2002) show that the largest ISP’s are
present mostly in urban areas.
11Our dummy variable indicates if a firm oﬀered ISDN service to consumers, not if a firm has
an ISDN connection to the Internet. Firms that oﬀer ISDN service to consumers require an
ISDN connection to the Internet themselves. But many ISP’s had ISDN connections without
oﬀering ISDN service to consumers.
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July 1997 October 1997
None 1909 85.5% 1136 50.9%
X2 185 8.3 389 17.4
Flex 112 5.0 523 23.4
Both 27 1.2 185 8.3
Table 1: Number and Percent of ISP’s Adopting
assignments of switches to calling areas when a question arises. We find that
this arbitrariness is not very problematic for looking at some simple summary
statistics.12 Moreover, our final estimation procedure properly accounts for the
overlap patterns.
Our method creates 2,298 local calling areas. Local calling areas have rela-
tively few firms in each one. The average number of ISP’s in a calling area is
15 with a standard deviation of 20.8. However, there are 738 calling areas with
only 1 ISP and the median number is only 3. Table 2 gives average adoption
rates by local calling area. Again, there are only a few adopters in each calling
area. The average number of adopters in October 1997 is about 6. Interestingly,
although Flex leads X2 when tallied by ISP (as in Table 1), X2 leads Flex when
tallied by locale (as in Table 2).13
5 Simple Measures of Diﬀerentiation
Our goal is to show that ISP’s diﬀerentiated across standards instead of coordi-
nated on one standard or the other. In this section, we present simple statistics
that capture the spread of ISP’s across the two standards within local calling
12Most of the issues arise in dense urban markets with many competitors. Medium to low
density locations make up the bulk of the dataset and these are not problematic.
13Although this finding suggests that larger firms were more likely to adopt X2, we find the
parameter on size (POPs) to be very similar across the two standards in our final estimation
procedure.
13
7/97 10/97
ISP’s 15.06 15.06
Adopters 0.99 5.98
X2 0.59 2.58
Flex 0.22 1.99
Both 0.18 1.40
Table 2: Averages by Local Calling Area
areas. This “first cut” of the data shows that ISP adoption is characterized by
diﬀerentiation. This prediction is borne out in the more comprehensive empiri-
cal model presented in Section 6.
Our approach in this section is to compare the national adoption rate with
the adoption rate in each local calling area. If the rates are close to the same,
it suggests that ISP’s were diﬀerentiating from each other. If local markets
are characterized by agglomeration on one standard or the other, it suggests
network eﬀects were important.
Let {n0i , nAi , nBi , nABi } be the number of ISP’s in market i (a local calling
area) that do not adopt, that adopt Flex, that adopt X2 and that adopt both.
We start with a graphical presentation of our data. We calculate the number
of adopters of only X2 as a percentage of the number of ISP’s that adopt only
one standard, ignoring markets with only one such firm. That is, we compute
nBi /(n
A
i + n
B
i ) in each market where n
A
i + n
B
i > 1. For now, we ignore firms
that adopt both or neither standard (n0i and n
AB
i ). The national adoption rate
computed in this way is 58%.
Figure 1 presents a histogram of adoption by calling area and captures much
of what we try to show in this paper. The black bars represent the observed
data. Figure 1 shows that most of the calling areas have between 50% and
80% adoption rates of X2, and there are very few calling areas with adoption
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Figure 1: Percentage of ISP’s adopting X2.
close to 0 or 100%. As a point of comparison, we also calculate what would
have happened if ISP’s made independent random choices — that is, if nAi + n
B
i
firms in each market chose between A and B independently with probability
58%. These results are represented by the gray bars. Figure 1 shows that
independent random choice puts less weight in the center of the distribution
and more weight on the tails. The black bars are higher than grey bars for
the middle three bins and are lower than the grey bars for the outer seven.
Figure 1 suggests that diﬀerentiation (even splits between each standard within
each locale) characterizes this data, relative to independent random choice or
coordination.
In order to statistically test whether the hypothesis of independent ran-
dom choice can be rejected, we use the dartboard index of Ellison and Glaeser
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(1997).14 We compute the index for each calling area separately and take an
unweighted national average. The dartboard index is positive if ISP’s are more
coordinated on a single standard than we would expect from independent ran-
dom choice and is negative if they are more diﬀerentiated. The dartboard index
accounts for the fact that we have small sample sizes within locales15. Under
the null hypothesis of independent random choice, the dartboard index is 0 and
we use Monte Carlo techniques to generate a standard deviation.
Results appear in Table 3. In Row 1, we consider ISP’s that adopt only one
standard and markets with at least two such ISP’s. In the terminology of Ellison
and Glaeser, firms can be in one of two states A and B and we check if nAi and
nBi show evidence of agglomeration, dispersion or independent allocation. The
average dartboard index across 1595 markets is -0.085. Under the null, it would
be 0 with a standard error of 0.012, so the null hypothesis can be rejected in
favor of diﬀerentiation. Row 2 includes firms that adopt both standards as if
they adopted X2. That is, the two states are {A} and {B,AB} and we compute
the dartboard index on nAi and (n
B
i + n
AB
i ). The results do not change. We
may also be interested in the distinction between adopting and not adopting,
ignoring the choice of standard. We consider the case where firms can be in
one of the two states {A,B,AB} or {0} and compare (nAi + nBi + nABi ) to n0i .
Row 3 shows that for this case, the data appears coordinated (in each case,
we include only markets with at least 2 ISP’s satisfying the relevant criteria).
That is, most markets are characterized by very high adoption or very little
14Ellison and Glaeser’s approach has the advantage over more standard tests such as the
Pearson Goodness of Fit test that it not only rejects independent random choice but also tells
the researcher whether the rejection is due to disperse or agglomerated data. See Rysman
and Greenstein (2003) for further discussion and an alternative approach.
15The dartboard index is essentially a Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of ISPs over each
standard. If there are a small number of ISP’s in a locale, we expect the Gini to be greater
then zero regardless of how they make decisions, so the dartboard index modifies the Gini
coeﬃcient by the Herfindahl of the decision making agents to get a value that has an expected
value of zero under the null of independent random choice.
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Table 3: Dartboard Test for Diﬀerentiation
Description index std dev t-statistic Markets
Adopt only X2 vs. Adopt only Flex -0.085 0.012 -6.78 1595
Adopt X2 or Both vs. Adopt only Flex -0.038 0.012 -3.12 1698
Adopt vs. Not Adopt 0.034 0.010 3.32 2200
adoption, and there are few markets in between. This result may be explained
by local rivalry or local market demand (i.e., local demographic information),
and suggests the importance of controlling for local conditions in more stringent
tests.
Another way to look at the issue of diﬀerentiation across standards is to
exploit the dynamic aspect of the data. We can compare choices made up to
July 1997 to choices made afterwards. The results appear in Table 4. This
table shows that there were 1029 local calling areas where there was at least one
adopter by July. The columns refer to whether or not X2 was leading in that
calling area by July 1997. On the row is the number of calling areas where more
ISP’s adopted X2 than Flex in the July-October window. For instance, the table
shows that of the 686 calling areas where X2 led in July, Flex tied or led X2
from over the next 3 months in more than half the calling areas. The numbers
are more striking for calling areas where Flex led in July. Of these 152 calling
areas, there are 3 times as many locales where X2 led for July - October as there
are those where Flex led. These numbers suggest that ISP’s that observed one
standard obtain a lead did not continue to adopt that standard.
These statistics characterized the data by diﬀerentiation, not coordination.
They are strongly suggestive of the results we find in the full empirical model
in Section 6.
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Table 4: Adoption in July 1997 versus adoption over the next 3 months
Adoption by 7/97
X2>Flex Tied Flex>X2 Total
Adoption X2 Leads for 7-10 325 79 67 471
Betw. 7/97 Tie 178 54 65 297
and 10/97 Flex Leads 183 58 20 261
Total Calling Areas 686 191 152 1029
6 Estimation
While the results in Section 5 are suggestive of an industry characterized by
diﬀerentiation, the methodology ignores important features of the industry. In
particular, ISP’s make a single adoption choice at all of their points-of-presence
so local calling areas are not independent markets. Even defining local callings
areas involves some arbitrariness. Furthermore, the methodology above does
not exploit demographic data and is diﬃcult to interpret when we recognize
that some firms adopt both standards. The main econometric model addresses
all of these features.
6.1 Model
In our econometric model, ISP’s that oﬀer 33K service at a POP decide whether
or not to oﬀer 56k service on X2, Flex, both or neither. In this sense, the model is
like an entry game into two markets, X2 and Flex, in which we observe potential
entrants, as in Berry (1992). Following the theoretical model in Rysman (2003a),
we model the entry game as one of imperfect information, where we allow for
firms to observe their own unobservable draws but not those of their competitors.
In this regard, we follow the estimation methodology of Seim (2002).16
16 Several recent papers have exploited this assumption to develop two-stage estimators of
discrete (and dynamic) games. See Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2003), Agguiregabiria and
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Our estimation model is as follows. There are n firms and I locations.
Locations in the model are equivalent to switches in the data.17 The set of
locations in which firm j appears is ϑj . We compute ϑj to be the set of all
switches from which ISP j can be contacted by a local telephone call. A firm
may adopt either standard s, adopt both or not adopt, but the firm makes
the same adoption decision in every location. The number of firms that have
adopted technology s at location i besides j is nsi , where s can be equal to
{0, A,B,AB} (none, Flex, X2, and both). The potential adopters at a switch
are identified by finding all ISP’s that can be contacted by a local telephone
call.
Firms draw a cost shock εsj for each standard. Firms observe their own draws
of εsj but not those of their competitors. The shocks represent the adoption cost
for the firm. One source of these costs may be the combination of servers,
consumer grade modems and digital connections a firm has which, as argued
earlier, aﬀected the adoption cost of 56K and were arguably not well known
to their competitors. Because of this incomplete information, we search for a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.18 The expected profit from adopting A or B in
location i for firm j is:
E[πsij ] = x
l
iβ1 + x
f
j β2 +E[ψ1(n
s
i + 1) + ψ2n
AB
i |X, θ] s = A,B (1)
The “+1” in the parenthesis accounts for the eﬀect of firm j on profitability in
Mira (2002) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003).
17 In this section, location i refers to a switch whereas in Section 5, location i referred to a
local calling area.
18Our solution concept is equivalent to a Quantal Response Equilibrium. See McKelvey
and Palfrey (1995), and Haile, Hortascu and Kosenock (2003) for a discussion of its empirical
content.
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location i. Average profit for firm j from adopting standard s is:19
E[Πsj ] =
1
I
X
i∈ϑj
E[πsij] + ε
s
j , s = A,B
We assume the 33K market is competitive everywhere and normalize profits
from non-adoption to zero. The profits from adopting both standards is simply
the sum of adopting each standard. Therefore:
E[Π0j ] = 0 E[ΠABj ] = E[ΠAj ] +E[ΠBj ]
The firm chooses the option with the highest expected payoﬀ.20 The vectors
xli and x
f
j capture location specific and firm specific variables. The parame-
ters ψi capture the eﬀect of competition on profits. The matrix X contains all
exogenous variables, including all values of xli, x
f
j and adoption decisions by
firms in previous periods. The variable εsj is a random fixed cost for standard s
unobserved by the researcher or other firms. We assume that [εAj ε
B
j ] is distrib-
uted iid according the standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation
parameter ρ.21 The parameters θ = {β1, β2, ψ1, ψ2, ρ} are to be estimated. In
practice, we allow them to diﬀer for each standard. Our goal is to check whether
ψ1 < 0, which implies that firms prefer diﬀerentiation to agglomeration.
A widely recognized problem in the empirical literature on entry games is
the potentially endogenous determination of the number of competitors. A high
19Using average profit is equivalent to using total profit and imposing a particular form of
heteroskedasticity.
20Note that in describing profits, we have left oﬀ any terms representing value in the future.
We do not try to solve the full dynamic game and in this sense, the parameters we estimate
capture both the flow profit from their associated variable and the expected future profit.
In addition, they may capture the fact that waiting has diﬀerent values to diﬀerent firms,
depending on future expectations.
21An alternative approach would be to have firms that adopt both standards recieve a
(possibly negative) award due to economies of scope. It is diﬃcult to distinguish between
economies of scope and a correlation in errors, which Manski (1998) terms the reflection
problem. We take ρ to capture both correlation in errors and economies of scope.
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draw of εsj might be due to the fact the location is desirable. In that case, n
s
i will
also be high. Conversely, a high draw of εsj might suggest that n
s
i is small because
firm j will almost surely enter. However, as shown in Seim (2002), modelling
the entry game as one of imperfect information addresses this problem. In this
case, firms make their decision based not on nsi but on E[n
s
i |X,θ],which depends
only on exogenous variables. We discuss computation of E[nsi |X,θ] below.
Integrating over εAj and ε
B
j , the implied adoption probabilities for firms that
did not adopt in July are:
PjN = Prob(dj = N) = Φ(−ΠAj ,−ΠBj , ρ) (2)
Pjs = Prob(dj = s) = Φ(Πsj ,−Π−sj ,−ρ) s = A,B
PjAB = Prob(dj = AB) = Φ(ΠAj ,ΠBj , ρ)
Here, dj is the decision of firm j and Φ() is the bivariate normal CDF with
correlation parameter ρ. For a firm that adopted one technology in July, the
probability of adopting the other in October is:
Pjs = Prob(E[Πsj ] > −εsj |E[Π−sj ] > −ε
−s
j )
We compute this integral by Gaussian quadrature. The likelihood function for
observing the n decisions d1, ..., dn is:
L(d1, ..., dn,X,θ) =
nY
j=1
Pjdj (3)
In order to compute E[nsi |X,θ], we use the following relation: The expected
number of firms making choice s at location i can be divided into the the number
that chose s previously (by July 1997) ns,pri and the number choosing currently
n
s,cu
i , the expectation of which depends on the adoption probabilities. Let Υ(i)
be the set of firms present in location i:
E[nsi |X,θ] =ns,pri +E[ns,cui |X, θ] = ns,pri +
X
k∈Υ(i)
Pks (4)
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In order to calculate the term E[ψ1n
s
i +ψ2n
AB
i |X, θ], we follow Seim (2002)
and exploit the fact that the system of equations 1, 2 and 4 form a fixed point
equation, solved by the n× 4 matrix of adoption probabilities P, with element
Pjs. For any given set of parameters θ, the first step in solving for E[ψ1n
s
i +
ψ2n
AB
i |X, θ] is to compute E[Πsj ]0, the value of E[Πsj ] assuming no firms adopt.
Doing so gives probabilities of adoption P0 that we use to create an initial guess,
E[ψ1n
s
i+ψ2n
AB
i ]
0. Using this value, we calculate E[Πsj ]1, which generates a new
set of adoption probabilities P1 and a new value E[ψ1n
s
i+ψ2n
AB
i ]
1.We continue
iterating in this way as described by Seim (2002) until there is convergence,
thereby finding a fixed point in adoption probabilities for the system of best-
response functions.22 The appendix discusses the computation of the fixed point
in greater detail.
A weakness of our approach is that it does not guarantee that there is a
unique equilibrium. There may be multiple matrices P that solve the system
of equations above. In this model, this can occur for two reasons. The first
is associated with entry models and can occur if ψi < 0. Intuitively, there
could be an equilibrium where ISP 1 is expected to enter with high probability
and ISP 2 with low, and another equilibrium where the opposite is true. The
second is associated with network eﬀects and can occur if ψi > 0. In this case,
there can be an equilibrium where most firms adopt and one where few firms
adopt. Our methodology requires either a unique equilibrium or an equilibrium
selection mechanism. The methodology relies on asymmetry in the data to
find uniqueness. For instance, while one might expect that there are multiple
equilibria between two symmetric firms, it would be less likely between a very
large firm and a very small firm.23 We further discuss this issue with the results.
22The adoption probabilities PjN , PjA, PjB, and Pj2 can be defined by only 2 cut-oﬀs, so
in fact, the solution to our fixed point system is an n× 2 matrix.
23 It is possible for there to be multiple equilibria in expectations that are so similar that
their diﬀerence is not important empirically.
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6.2 Identification
This methodology creates a variable E[ψ1n
s
i +ψ2n
AB
i |X, θ] that nicely captures
our intuition for identification. As with standard instrumenting techniques, it is
important that there are variables that aﬀect the expected number of adopters
that j faces but that do not otherwise aﬀect the decision of firm j. In this sense
the overlapping calling areas of diﬀerent ISPs acts as a virtue. The relationship
between firms that provides the best identifying power would be a firm that
is completely overlapped by another firm, where the overlapping firm is also
present in many other locations. Then, the variable E[ψ1n
s
i + ψ2n
AB
i |X, θ] for
the small firm depends on a large amount of demographic data that do not
otherwise appear in the decision of the firm. Cases where two firms completely
overlap but do not appear in many other locations should not provide strong
identification as the same demographic data that aﬀect E[ψ1n
s
i + ψ2n
AB
i |X, θ]
also appear directly in the firms’ decisions. Similarly, firms that appear in many
diﬀerent locations but barely overlap with each other should not provide much
identification as these firms barely aﬀect E[ψ1n
s
i + ψ2n
AB
i |X, θ] for each other.
Other papers, such as Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2002), have used the
intuition that the decisions of geographically large firms can be thought of as
exogenous to the decisions of small firms. Our intuition is similar, although
we capture exogeneity in a more continuous way — the decision of a large firm
may be exogenous to a medium-sized firm and the decision of large and medium
firms may be exogenous to that of a small firm. With our methodology, we
do not have to make an a priori decision about which firms are exogenous to
which. A drawback is that we do not use the actual decision of large firms as an
exogenous variable, only the prediction of those decisions based on explanatory
variables.
Further important exogenous variation comes from the characteristics of
firms, such as their size and the presence of a digital connection. A final but
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potentially important form of exogenous variation comes from decisions made
by firms in July 1997. The above mentioned forms of exogenous variation diﬀer
across firms but not across standards. Without an exogenous variable that
varied by standard, we would not be able to predict that firms are more likely
to choose one standard or another. Adoption choices made three months earlier
provide this form of variation.24
7 Results
Table 5 presents the main results. The first two columns present coeﬃcient
estimates and standard errors from estimating Equation 1 using the observed
values of nsi instead of expected values. It is equivalent to a bivariate probit
model predicting adoption of Flex and X2. Relative to the histogram in Figure
1, this model controls for ISP decision-making across multiple markets, for de-
mographics and ISP characteristics and for the exact competitive environment
resulting from the pattern of local calling areas. This model does not explicitly
correct for endogeneity of choices by competing firms.25 We present these re-
sults as an interim step towards our true model and to evaluate the role of the
instruments in the true model.
However, we begin our discussion with the second column, which presents
results correcting for endogeneity according to the model of imperfect infor-
mation described above. The result of primary interest is the first row, which
measures the eﬀect of the number of competitors on standard s on the proba-
24A common criticism of the entry literature is that it models dynamic processes as simul-
taneous games. While we are subject to this criticism as well, the eﬀects are mitigated by the
fact that we model only a 3 month process as a simultaneous game.
25Note that under the assymetric information assumptions made in the model, the realized
number of entrants nsi is exogenous. Furthermore, under the assumption that nsi −E[nsi |X, θ]
is normal, this diﬀerence is absorbed by the probit error and the model using the observed nsi
in place of E[nsi |X, θ] is actually a consistent estimator for the true model.
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bility of adopting standard s. In the first row of column 2, the eﬀect is negative
and significant, implying the incentive to diﬀerentiate outweighed the incentive
to coordinate. The eﬀect is reasonable and important. Doubling the number of
competitors adopting Flex reduces the probability of adopting Flex for a given
firm by 4.3 percentage points, a 13.9% change. These numbers are evaluated
at means in the data, where the average number of competitors on Flex is 5.78
and the average number of competitors on X2 is 7.02.
The coeﬃcient on the number of firms adopting both standards is positive
but insignificant. We provide an interpretation for this result below. We see that
ISP characteristics are important predictors of adoption. Firms that have digital
connections to the Internet are much more likely to adopt 56K.26 Larger firms,
as measured by the number of switches a firms serves, are also more likely to
adopt both standards. This eﬀect is estimated to be quadratic, probably driven
by the fact that the very largest firms in this data set do not adopt.
Under the assumption that the 33K market is competitive in all markets, the
number of ISP’s in a market should not matter directly. However, we include
the log of the number of ISP’s at a switch as a proxy for both the consumer
population at a switch (which we do not otherwise observe) and that popula-
tions’ preference for technology. This parameter is positive and significant. We
also include a dummy for whether that standard had a lead at this switch in
July, 1997. This parameter is not significant. It may be that there was simply
very little variation in this variable, as suggested by the Table 2. We also in-
clude the number Internet backbone providers at a switch. These firms often
leased modem banks to ISP’s indicating it was particularly easy to adopt in
these locations. As expected, this coeﬃcient is positive and significant.
Demographic characteristics do not appear to be very important as only a
few are estimated to be significant. Surprisingly, the percentage of the pop-
26As above, digital indicates the firm has a T1 line or oﬀers ISDN service to customers, but
could be 0 if a firm has ISDN lines but does not oﬀer ISDN service to consumers.
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Firms on same standard -0.094 (0.007) -0.050 (0.013)
Firms on both standards 0.121 (0.012) 0.037 (0.031)
constant -1.386 (0.726) -2.287 (0.744)
ln POP's 0.149 (0.055) 0.107 (0.058)
ln POP's sq -0.012 (0.006) -0.010 (0.006)
digital 0.624 (0.054) 0.659 (0.055)
ln # of ISP's 0.059 (0.047) 0.122 (0.054)
Lead in July -0.047 (0.162) 0.091 (0.164)
# backbone providers 0.0008 (0.002) 0.005 (0.002)
med HH Inc ('000's) 0.004 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005)
% urban pop -0.009 (0.168) 0.041 (0.173)
% pop in MSA/PMSA 0.192 (0.211) -0.045 (0.222)
est./capita 12.714 (6.960) 9.155 (7.281)
% college grads -5.630 (1.690) -3.803 (1.794)
population growth -0.542 (0.649) 0.347 (0.657)
% in diff county 5 yr 2.021 (0.642) 1.520 (0.680)
# home permits/cap. 3.838 (3.790) -4.253 (3.786)
     rho -0.271 (0.046) -0.103 (0.038)
mean log likelihood
observations
Notes: Column 1 assumes all explanatory variables are exogenous.
Column 2 corrects for endogeneity in the first two variables.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
22062206
-0.915 -0.954
With endogeneity 
correction
Without endogeneity
correction
Table 5: Main Results
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ulation that graduated from college is negative. As expected, the percentage
of the population living in a diﬀerent county five years previous (a proxy for
county growth) is positive and significant. A test of joint insignificance for the
demographic variables can be rejected, suggesting that the demographics still
play a role in identifying the parameters on endogenous variables despite their
individually imprecise estimates.
The parameter ρ is estimated to be negative, implying that firms that adopt
one technology are less likely to adopt the other. This may reflect a number
of issues, such as diseconomies of scope or a negative correlation in unobserved
shocks.
Returning to the first column in Table 5 (which does not control for endo-
geneity), we see that the number of firms on the same standard has a negative
and significant impact on adopting of that standard. Most of the results are
similar across the two models, although the number of ISP’s in a market is in-
significant in column 1. The parameter on the number of firms adopting both
standards is positive and significant in column 1. We interpret this result as
reflecting consumer adoption patterns. If some areas have a strong preference
for new technology, we might expect many firms to adopt both technologies
in those markets. If we do not otherwise control for these consumer actions,
we will estimate a positive coeﬃcient on the eﬀect of firms that adopt both.
This “endogeneity” interpretation is supported by column 2, as the eﬀect turns
insignificant when we estimate the structural parameter.
Overall, we conclude that the incentive to diﬀerentiate outweighed the incen-
tive to coordinate in this market. This result is surprising in these tests because
of the size of the markets. Finding diﬀerentiation in favor of independent ran-
dom choice is more diﬃcult in large markets as the two hypothesis have similar
predictions as the number of agents gets large. In the histogram in Figure 1,
the level of observation is a market and the average number of adopters in a
market is 5.98. However, the level of observation in these regressions is the ISP
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and ISP’s face on average 17.1 adopters. One need only a few large markets to
achieve this dichotomy. Even so, the results reject independent random choice
by ISP’s in favor of diﬀerentiation by ISP’s.
We perform a number of robustness tests. An important component for our
story is that the two technologies are functionally identical. We test for that by
testing the hypothesis that the parameters are equal across the two standards.
Table 6 presents results in which parameters are allowed to diﬀer across the
two technologies. The first set of results assume that nsi is exogenous and the
second correct for endogeneity. Both the likelihood ratio test and the Wald test
reject the hypothesis of joint equality of each parameter row in both models.
However, we present p-values for variable-by-variable Wald tests and these are
more supportive. For these independent tests, we see that the hypothesis of
equality cannot be rejected at a 95% or even 90% level of confidence for any
variable for the model controlling for endogeneity. Even when not controlling
for endogeneity, the hypothesis of individual equality can be rejected at a 95%
level of confidence for only three variables. Furthermore, variables look broadly
similar across the equations. Given these results and the strong institutional
support for the symmetry of the two technologies, we conclude that restricting
the parameters to be the same across technologies is reasonable.
Also, note that the variable measuring the eﬀect of the number of firms on
the same standard is negative for both technologies in both models. However, it
is insignificant in one of the cases: X2 in the model correcting for endogeneity.
Why is this result insignificant here but significant when we restrict parameters
to be the same across technologies? One reason is that allowing the parameters
on endogenous variables to diﬀer across standards means we need an instrument
that varies across standards. The fact that we get inconclusive results in this
circumstance suggests that our instrument, adoption in July, does not provide
the necessary variation to identify all of these parameters. Indeed, note that
the dummy for the standard having a lead in July turns out to be insignificant
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throughout the results.
We present another set of robustness results in Table 7. In the first column,
we include the number of firms on the other standard as a third endogenous
variable. If consumer adoption were adequately controlled for, the number of
firms on the other standard might be reasonably expected to have no impact.
However, in our circumstance, it may reflect consumer adoption. In fact, we
find the new variable is statistically insignificant. Otherwise, we find similar
results to those reported in Table 5. Note that the variable of primary interest,
the parameter on the number of firms in the same standard, is again negative
but less precisely estimated: the t-statistic is 1.957.
As a final robustness test, we check if our results are driven by the firms that
adopt one standard in July. We re-estimate the model in column 2 of Table 5
but construct the likelihood value from only the 1909 observations that did not
adopt at all in July.27 The results appear in column 2 of Table 7. The results are
very similar to those estimated using all of the observations. The most striking
diﬀerence is the change in the estimate of ρ. Here, ρ is estimated to be much
closer to zero and insignificant. This result suggests that ISP’s that adopted
one technology in July were less likely to adopt both in October than ISP’s that
did not adopt at all in July. As the results of primary interest do not change in
this model, we do not further explore this issue here.
As discussed above, it is necessary that there be a unique equilibria or we
specify an equilibrium selection mechanism. For models that control for endo-
geneity, we search for multiple equilibria at the estimated parameters. We do
this by using diﬀerent starting values in our fixed point algorithm that finds
equilibrium adoption probabilities. For instance, we start the algorithm at zero
adoption for all firms, certain adoption of A for all firms, certain adoption uni-
27The model of imperfect information requires us to make predictions about the adoption of
the remaining technology for firms that adopt one standard in July. The estimated parameters
are applied to those firms in this sense.
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Test for Test for
Flex X2 Equality Flex X2 Equality
Firms on same standard -0.132 -0.065 0.0004 -0.063 -0.024 0.296
(0.014) (0.012) (0.026) (0.021)
Firms on both standards 0.126 0.134 0.811 0.066 -0.009 0.399
(0.020) (0.022) (0.059) (0.053)
constant -1.865 -0.616 0.482 -2.486 -1.891 0.739
(1.074) (1.247) (1.114) (1.250)
ln POP's 0.248 0.100 0.235 0.153 0.073 0.510
(0.081) (0.086) (0.083) (0.088)
ln POP's sq -0.026 -0.002 0.123 -0.017 -0.002 0.315
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
digital 0.680 -0.514 0.319 0.729 -0.243 0.239
(0.082) (0.276) (0.080) (0.274)
ln # of ISP's 0.081 -0.023 0.323 0.123 0.083 0.716
(0.064) (0.081) (0.073) (0.084)
Lead in July -0.108 0.124 0.208 0.108 0.064 0.820
(0.167) (0.103) (0.174) (0.106)
# backbone providers 0.004 -0.003 0.100 0.005 0.003 0.757
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
med HH Inc ('000's) -0.010 0.015 0.012 -0.003 0.013 0.130
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
% urban pop 0.547 -0.514 0.006 0.338 -0.243 0.125
(0.242) (0.276) (0.246) (0.274)
% pop in MSA/PMSA 0.106 0.208 0.840 0.123 -0.304 0.400
(0.297) (0.373) (0.300) (0.386)
est./capita -1.997 22.118 0.131 3.642 10.735 0.660
(10.394) (11.141) (10.830) (11.259)
% college grads -2.187 -7.977 0.141 -3.455 -3.198 0.949
(2.473) (2.822) (2.632) (2.861)
population growth 0.208 -1.440 0.315 0.717 -0.039 0.648
(0.987) (1.123) (1.028) (1.115)
% in diff county 5 yr 2.320 1.322 0.499 2.271 0.150 0.152
(0.896) (1.083) (0.938) (1.100)
# home permits/cap. -0.515 10.319 0.266 -7.690 0.401 0.402
(5.749) (6.695) (5.874) (6.583)
     rho 
mean log likelihood
Number of observations
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are the results of a bivariate probit predicting the adoption of X2 and Flex.
Columns 4 and 5 correct for the endogeneity of the first two variables.
Columns 3 and 6 reports p-values for Wald tests for the equality of each parameter.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Separate Parameters For Each Technology
W/O Endogeneity Correction With Endogeneity Correction
0.124
(0.103)
-0.899
0.064
(0.106)
-0.939
Table 6: Results from allowing parameters to diﬀer across technologies.
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Firms on same standard -0.137 (0.070) -0.058 (0.016)
Firms on both standards 0.027 (0.032) 0.043 (0.032)
Firms on other standard 0.094 (0.071)
constant -2.051 (0.759) -1.967 (0.808)
ln POP's 0.111 (0.058) 0.140 (0.063)
ln POP's sq -0.011 (0.006) -0.013 (0.007)
digital 0.663 (0.055) 0.664 (0.058)
ln # of ISP's 0.106 (0.053) 0.114 (0.057)
Lead in July 0.261 (0.195) 0.086 (0.169)
# backbone providers 0.0044 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002)
med HH Inc ('000's) 0.006 (0.005) 0.009 (0.005)
% urban pop 0.041 (0.174) 0.137 (0.186)
% pop in MSA/PMSA -0.040 (0.222) -0.105 (0.241)
est./capita 8.855 (7.346) 8.369 (7.811)
% college grads -3.969 (1.808) -4.920 (1.951)
population growth 0.216 (0.664) -0.022 (0.709)
% in diff county 5 yr 1.548 (0.682) 1.645 (0.730)
# home permits/cap. -3.741 (3.839) -3.287 (4.103)
     rho -0.097 (0.038) -0.015 (0.045)
mean log likelihood
observations
Notes: Column 1 treats the first three variables as endogenous
Column 2 uses only observations that did not adopt at all in July
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
-0.953 -1.035
2206 1909
Three endogenous Only firms that have
variables not adoted in July
Table 7: Robustness results.
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formly distributed across A, B and both for all firms, and several other values.
In all cases, the algorithm finds one and only set of probabilities that satisfy
the equilibrium conditions. We conclude that each of the models estimated here
contain only one equilibrium. As suggested above, there is enough asymmetry
between firms to rule out multiple equilibria.
To summarize, we find evidence consistent with our central hypothesis, that
competition shaped ISP decision making over modem choice. We show that
competition consistently pushed behavior towards diﬀerentiation. ISP’s were
less likely to adopt a standard as more of their competitors adopted that stan-
dard.
8 Sources of Adoption Delay
As it turned out, 56K modem sales to ISP’s went very slowly relative to the
hopes of the modem producers. As we discussed, barely 50% of ISP’s adopted
56K by October 1997. Furthermore, none of the large ISP’s (AOL, AT&T,
UUNET, MSN, GTE, Bell-South, EarthLink) adopted. Due to the large skew
in market share (e.g. twenty firms serve more than three quarters of the users),
the vast majority of customers could not use 56K unless they switched from their
existing large ISP to one of these smaller ISPs. Most consumers did not make
this switch, even though most geographic regions had at least one or more ISP
carrying 56K. Accordingly, sales to consumers were much less than the modem
manufacturers expected.
Beyond expecting greater sales, industry participants expected the market to
coordinate on a single standard. The sponsors of the two technologies engaged in
a “standards war,” with deep discounts as well as marketing promotions arguing
that their technology would be the widely adopted standard.
Rockwell and USR both felt that the source of the slow sales was the stan-
dards battle and turned to the International Telecommunications Union, associ-
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ated with the United Nations, to set a standard. The ITU announced the V.90
standard, an amalgam of X2 and Flex (but incompatible with both), in Febru-
ary 1998. At the time, this was regarded as the shortest period of time the ITU
had ever required to reach a decision. (Press Release ITU/98-4). Although the
ITU had no jurisdiction in this market, it created a focal point for the industry.
Sales were very strong thereafter and we interpret this widespread adoption by
both ISP’s and consumers as evidence of the value of coordinating on a single
standard.
Given the importance of standardization, why were consumers and ISP’s
unable to coordinate without the ITU? What role did the diﬀerentiation by
ISP’s identified above play in that process? In this section, we argue that
diﬀerentiation may have prolonged adoption delay.
Intuitively, network eﬀects provide a force in favor of “tipping” towards one
technology or the other. Even with many geographically dispersed markets and
dispersed decision making, theory would lead one to expect local “tipping.”
That, in turn, might give rise to quick national unification of all local markets
on the same standard or geographic balkanization, with Chicago and Atlanta
tipping one way, Cleveland and Denver another, and so on. Instead, our tests
show that there was no coordination at any level.
Can such splitting result in adoption delay if competition is strong enough?
If consumers prefer a coordinated market and observe a split market, they may
delay adoption until one of the two technologies emerges as a standard. Our
model of how this might work is formalized in Rysman (2003a). In Rysman
(2003a), consumers and firms play a dynamic adoption game choosing between
two standards. Adopting a standard allows the adopter to trade with other
adopters. Firms draw random fixed costs of adoption for each standard in each
period. For particular parameter values, the model exhibits an equilibrium
with adoption delay. A small group of technology-loving consumers adopt each
standard in the first period. The remaining consumers delay their adoption
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until a critical number of firms adopts one standard or the other. Knowing this,
firms avoid the standard with more firms on it in order to take advantage of the
higher margins available on the other standard. This diﬀerentiation by firms
justifies the consumers’ decision to delay adoption as they cannot guess which
standard will gain widespread acceptance. This equilibrium is more likely to
exist if competition is very fierce as it causes firms to avoid competition. This
models sets up the association between diﬀerentiation and delay that we claim
took place in the 56K market.28 The results of this model diﬀer from most
previous work on network eﬀects, which would predict coordination in a case
with homogenous technologies like the 56K modems.
However, if a delay in standardization happened for some reason other than
ISP diﬀerentiation, we might still expect to see ISP’s diﬀerentiating in response
to consumer behavior. Here we discuss explanations for adoption delay alter-
native to ISP diﬀerentiation. One possible explanation for the high sales of
modems in 1998 could be that there was a substantial increase in demand for
modems and Internet in early 1998 unrelated to standardization. We are skep-
tical of this explanation since the fastest period of growth in Internet adoption
was already under way in 1997. For instance, there were already thousands of
ISPs in the US, providing service to all but a small part of the US population
(Downes and Greenstein, 2002). Second, the ITU’s design for the V.90 did not
diﬀer functionally from either the X2 or Flex standards, and yet the introduc-
tion of the V.90 generated enormous growth in demand. Another alternative
is that consumers were waiting for a new technology in 1997 (such as ISDN or
28Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992) also consider models where multiple
networks exist when eﬃciency calls for a single network. They rely on consumer heterogeneity
but Church and Gandal specifically note the ineﬃcient incentives of software providers to
diﬀerentiate across standards. Ellison and Fudenberg (2002) indentify a similar issue in a
more general setting and with homogenous standards. All three of these papers study static
games where all consumers adopt. Rysman (2003a) shows in a dynamic game that the choice
between standards can lead consumers to delay adoption, a particularly ineﬃcient result.
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cable modems) that they gave up on in 1998 in favor of 56K modems. We find
these hypotheses implausible.
We believe that most compelling alternative explanation is that market par-
ticipants were waiting for the ITU decision. Indeed, deliberations over 56K
modems at the ITU took place as early as November 1996 and the ITU claimed
that it would announce a standard about two years after the introduction of
the modem. However, there are a number of reasons to believe that the market
could have progressed before the ITU decision. First, it is not clear how credible
the ITU’s scheduling claims were. Two years would be very quick relative to
previous ITU decisions. Farrell (1996) reports that similar organizations deliver
standards in 5 years, on average. Also, the ITU had no enforcement power in
this case, it served only to create a focal point. If one technology could emerge
as the market standard, it might not matter what the ITU’s decision was. Even
two years was considered a long time in this industry, enough time to establish
a private standard. Furthermore, the ITU might pick one standard unmodified.
In the ITU’s previous interaction with the modem industry, it chose Rockwell’s
model for the 33.6K standard almost unmodified. Again, success in the pri-
vate market could influence the ITU along these lines. As evidence that the
market was not waiting for the ITU, note that the sponsors of the two tech-
nologies competed very aggressively on the market to become the 56K modem
standard.29
Another possibility for why there was adoption delay is that consumers were
simply confused. It was a new product and consumers had little information as
to which standard to pick so they waited. We believe that this explanation is
consistent with our story. Indeed, we would expect consumers that adopt before
a standard is set to choose randomly. Our point is that one source of consumer
29Also, note that it would have been diﬃcult for the ITU to act without industry support.
There is evidence that Motorola prevented the advent of a new standard at an earlier ITU
meeting by demanding high licensing fees for a patented technology. (Greene, 1997)
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confusion is that ISP’s split evenly between the two standards. Similar to con-
fused consumers, we could lay the blame at PC makers because they did not
pick a default 56K modem technology to bundle with computers. But, as with
consumer adoption, the explanation for this behavior must be that PC mak-
ers could not predict which standard would gain acceptance, which presumably
is at least partly because PC makers observed ISP’s evenly separating across
standards.
Note that Shapiro and Varian (1999) discuss the tactics by sponsors of com-
peting standards, both in general and in the particular case of 56K (on pages
267-270). Their general discussion focuses on characterizing a standards battle
and deducing whether tactics are aligned with market incentives. Their discus-
sion of the 56K modem case is broadly consistent with ours. However, they
do not oﬀer a detailed explanation of why there was adoption failure previous
to the ITU decision and do not consider incentives to diﬀerentiate across the
standards by ISPs.30
9 Conclusion
This paper studies the importance of competition in technology adoption. We
exploit a unique data set on the standardization process for 56K modems in
numerous geographically independent markets. We show that Internet Service
Providers split evenly across the two available standards in local markets, con-
firming the importance of competition. We show that ISP’s split much more
evenly than independent random choice would predict with the dartboard index
of Ellison and Glaeser (1997). We confirm this result in a bivariate probit frame-
30Shapiro and Varian suggest a faster diﬀusion process then we do prior to the ITU decision,
relying mostly on announced adoption decisions for source material. Most of these announce-
ments come from the medium to large firms. As they point out, many of these announcements
were not followed by deployment. We follow our data source about deployments and report
non-deployment for the largest firms. See Rickard (1997a,1997b, 1998).
36
work that controls for ISP characteristics, demographics and decision-making
by ISP’s in multiple markets. Finally, we verify the result in a model based
on an entry game of imperfect information that controls for the endogeneity
of entry between rival ISP’s. The fact that competitive forces are so strong is
particularly surprising given the presence of an indirect network eﬀect between
ISP and consumer adoption of a 56K standard.
We use this result to consider a new hypothesis about adoption delay in
a standards war. Previous theoretical work typically predicts that when net-
work eﬀects are present, competition between two undiﬀerentiated technologies
should lead to relatively quick standardization. However, this market failed to
standardize without the intervention of a standard-setting organization. The re-
sult that ISP’s diﬀerentiated across markets is consistent with our theory (for-
malized in Rysman, 2003a) that competitive diﬀerentiation across standards
caused consumers to delay their adoption, and ultimately necessitated the in-
tervention of the standard-setting organization. More broadly, the competitive
environment of service providers may be an important determinant in the suc-
cess or failure of a standards war, a previously overlooked issue by researchers,
policy makers and private-sector managers.
10 Appendix
Details on computing the fixed point algorithm: We can write E[Πsj ] as:
E[Πsj ] = x
f
j β2 +
1
I
X
i∈ϑj
xliβ1 + ψ1
1
I
X
i∈ϑj
E[nsi |X, θ] + ψ1 + ψ2
1
I
X
i∈ϑj
E[nABi |X, θ]
Let Λ(j) be the set of firms that overlap with j and let λjk be the number of
switches at which j overlaps with k. Then we have that:
X
i∈ϑj
E[nsi |X, θ] =
X
i∈ϑj
X
k∈Υ(i)
Pks =
X
k∈Λ(j)
λjkPks
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Therefore, the average expected number of entrants faced by firm j depends only
on the number of locations at which j faces entrants and their entry probabilities,
not on where j faces them. That is, facing 3 markets with one potential entrant
in each has the same competitive implications as facing 2 markets with no
potential entrants and 1 market with 3, assuming entry probabilities are the
same. This feature allows us to solve the fixed point algorithm in an economical
manner. Let Λ be an n×n matrix with λjk in position j, k with λjk = 0 if j = k.
Let ψ be the 4× 1 matrix with elements 1,2,3 and 4 measuring the competitive
impact of firms adopting none, the same standard, the other standard and both.
In our implementation, ψ = [0, ψ1, 0, ψ2] for Flex and ψ = [0, 0, ψ1, ψ2] for X2.
Then:
E[Πsj ] = x
f
j β2 +
1
I
X
i∈ϑj
xliβ1 +ΛPψ + ψ1 (5)
Solving the fixed point algorithm consists of picking a starting matrix P0, plug-
ging into Equation 5 and plugging the result into Equation 2 to obtain a new
matrix of adoption probabilities P1. We can iterate this way until convergence.
The term
P
i∈ϑj x
l
i/I can be computed once at the beginning of the estimation
algorithm, further reducing the computational burden.
Note how restricting the competitive impact to be linear reduces the com-
putational burden: we need only know the number of locations at which any
firm overlaps with any other firm. If we were to add square terms, we would
need to know the number of locations at which a firm overlaps with any pair
of competitors and cubic terms require us to know the how many locations a
firm overlaps with any triplet. Putting in a more complicated term, such as
the ratio of adopters of one standard to the other, would likely requires us to
loop through every firm-location combination in the data (more than 200,000
items) and would be infeasible to our knowledge. It is straightforward to add
these terms to the analysis that assumes exogeneity and we found that it did not
change the analysis. For instance, adding squares of the number of competitors
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adopting one of the choices does not change any of the results in a substantial
way.
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